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I.       JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
 
Pham  petitioned this Court from a final judgment of the Utah Court of 
Appeals dated May 19, 2016, Case No. 20140435-CA affirming the order of the 
Third District Court for the County of Utah, Judge Katie Bernards-Goodman, in 
which Pham was convicted on all counts.  No motions regarding a request for 
rehearing or for an extension of time to file a petition for writ of certiorari have been 
filed.  No cross-petition has been filed in this case. This Court granted Pham’s 
Petition.  This Court has jurisdiction under U.C.A. §78A-3-102.  
 
II.      QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW  
QUESTION NO. 1:    Did the Court of Appeals incorrectly conclude that the 
admittance of preliminary hearing testimony of the unavailable victim/witness did 
not violate Pham’s Six Amendment Right to Confrontation as articulated by the 
United States Supreme Court in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004)?  
Standard of review of Issue No. 1: 
 
On certiorari, this Court reviews “the decision of the court of appeals for 
correctness.” State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ¶ 25, 63 P. 3d 650 (Utah 2002). The 
underlying questions of constitutional interpretation are questions of law that are 
reviewed for correctness; no deference is provided to the district court’s legal 
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conclusions. Id. The district court’s decision to admit testimony that may implicate 
the confrontation clause is also a question of law reviewed for correctness. State v. 
Poole, 232 P.3d 519, 522 (Utah 2010) (internal citations omitted). 
Preservation of Issue No. 1 at page 4 Pham’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari and at 
page 5 of Pham’s Opening Brief to the Court of Appeals.   
 
QUESTION  NO. 2:   Is the Court of Appeals’ interpretation of the Confrontation 
right and reliance upon State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537 (Utah 1981) misplaced in 
light of Crawford and this Court’s decisions in State of Utah v. Timmerman, 218 
P.3d 590, 594, 2009 UT 58 (Utah 2009); State of Utah v. Schmidt, 2015 UT 65 
(Utah 2015); State of Utah v. Jones, 2016 UT 4 (Utah 2016); and the Constitution 
of the State of Utah, Art. 1 § 12.    
Standard of review of Issue No. 2: 
 
On certiorari, this Court reviews “the decision of the court of appeals for 
correctness.” State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ¶ 25, 63 P. 3d 650. The underlying 
questions of constitutional interpretation are questions of law that are reviewed for 
correctness; no deference is provided to the district court’s legal conclusions. Id.  
The district court’s decision to admit testimony that may implicate the 
confrontation clause is also a question of law reviewed for correctness. State v. 
Poole, 232 P.3d 519, 522 (internal citations omitted). 
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Preservation of Issue No. 2 at page 4 Pham’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari and 
was argued extensively at pages 16-26 of Pham’s Opening Brief to the Court of 
Appeals.  
III. DETERMINATIVE STATUES 
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, which applies to 
both federal and state criminal prosecutions, is controlling.  It states:  
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime 
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously 
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the 
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the 
assistance of counsel for his defense. 
 
Emphasis added.  
 
Utah Constitution Art. 1 § 12 is also determinative in this case, stating in 
relevant part: 
 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the 
function of that examination is limited to determining whether probable 
cause exists unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this 
constitution shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by 
statute or rule in whole or in part at any preliminary examination to 
determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to 
release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by 










                        IV.      STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
 Pham was involved in a confrontation with Mr. Menchaca at a convenience 
store parking lot, and as the confrontation escalated, Pham shot Menchaca. R. 292-  
Pham was criminally charged for the shooting.   Menchaca, an undocumented 
Mexican national, was available and testified at Pham’s preliminary hearing.  R. 
292 p. 40.  Menchaca then returned to Mexico during the pendency of the case and 
was not available to testify at trial.  One of the prosecutors read a transcript of 
Menchaca’s preliminary hearing testimony at trial, over Pham’s Sixth Amendment 
Confrontation as well as state law objections. R. 292 p. 40; and 293.   The trial 
court overruled Pham’s objection and allowed Menchaca’s preliminary hearing 
testimony to be read to the jury by a District Attorney.  Pham was convicted on all 
counts. R. 293 p. 140.  
 Pham timely appealed the conviction based on the admission of Menchaca’s 
preliminary hearing testimony over his objection and a contention that the 
prosecution failed to produce sufficient evidence regarding Menchaca’s wounds to 
support a conviction for discharge of a firearm causing serious bodily injury.  The 
Court of Appeals affirmed Pham’s convictions on both issues.  State of Utah v. 
Pham, 2016 UT App. 105 ¶ ¶ 2-8.  The issues raised by Pham in the Writ of 
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Certiorari concern only the admissibility of Menchaca’s preliminary hearing 
testimony as stated above.  
 
Statement of the Facts 
 Pham and his friend went to a convenience store to purchase food and 
drinks.  Menchaca and his girlfriend went to the same convenience store.  R. 292 p. 
5. Menchaca and Pham became engaged in a confrontation, which escalated. R. 
292 p.p. 15-68.   Eventually, Pham pulled out his gun and shot Menchaca. R. 292 
p.p. 15-68.  Pham was apprehended by police later that night and was charged with 
discharge of a firearm causing serious bodily injury, receiving or transferring a 
stolen vehicle, obstructing justice, and failing to stop or respond to an officer's 
signal. R. 142-143.  Pham claimed he shot Menchaca in self-defense and felt 
threatened by Menchaca.  R. 293 p.p. 69-91.  
 Menchaca testified at Pham's preliminary hearing, and Pham cross-
examined him for purposes of a preliminary hearing. R. 292.  Defense counsel did 
not yet have full discovery and conducted a limited cross-examination in light of 
the limited purpose of a preliminary hearing.  There was no cross-examination 
regarding his credibility and veracity. R. 292 p. 40.  
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It is undisputed that Menchaca moved to Mexico before the trial in this 
matter, and neither the United States Marshals Service nor the Mexican authorities 
were able to locate him. Menchaca’s unavailability is not an issue.  The State filed 
a motion in limine seeking to admit Menchaca 's preliminary hearing testimony. R. 
292 p. 40. The trial court granted that motion over Pham's objection.  Pham 
objected because the purpose of the preliminary hearing, his motives and ability to 
prepare for cross-examination, was different than the purpose of cross-examination 
during trial. R. 292-293.  Credibility of a witness, for instance, is not weighed 
during the preliminary hearing.  Pham argued the reading violated his Six 
Amendment right to Confrontation. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
At Pham's jury trial, Menchaca’s preliminary hearing testimony was read to 
the jury by one of the prosecutors. R. 292 p. 40    The Prosecution presented other 
witnesses and Pham testified in his own defense. Pham’s testimony was in direct 
conflict to Menchaca’s testimony, as Pham claimed he acted in self-defense. 
Menchaca’s credibility and veracity were key issues at trial. R. 292 p.p. 5-91;  293 
p.p. 50-91.   However, Pham did not have the opportunity to challenge Menchaca’s 
credibility or veracity, and the jury did not have the opportunity to evaluate 
Menchaca’s demeanor. This failure was critical to Pham’s defense. The jury found 
Pham guilty of all four charges. R. 293 p. 140.  State of Utah v. Pham, 2016 UT 




V. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The issue presented by this appeal affects a fundamental right of all Utah 
residents who are charged with a serious crime and request a preliminary hearing.  
A witness who testifies at a preliminary hearing and then is unavailable at trial is 
not generally subject to the type of cross-examination necessary to protect a 
defendant’s rights at trial.  The fundamental right at issue is the right of 
Confrontation provided by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  
Given the purpose and scope of a preliminary hearing in Utah, as defined by Utah 
Constitution Art. 1 § 12 and recent decisions of this Court, testimony given at 
preliminary hearings should generally not be admissible at trial.  The Utah Court of 
Appeals held otherwise, relying on a 1981, pre-Crawford case: State of Utah v. 
Brooks, 638 P.2d 537 (Utah 1981).   The Court of Appeals, however, questioned 
the viability of Brooks given the change in the Utah Constitution regarding 
preliminary hearings. See, Pham, FN 3 citing State of Utah v. Timmerman, 218 
P.3d 590, 594 (Utah 2009) without discussion.   
Furthermore, none of the recent Court of Appeals’ decisions analyze the 
impact of this Court’s recent decisions in Timmerman, State of Utah v. Schmidt, 
2015 UT 65 (Utah 2015), and State of Utah v. Jones, 2016 UT 4 (Utah 2016)  on 
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these issues.  In Timmerman, Schmidt, and Jones this Court articulated the scope, 
purpose, and evidentiary burden at a preliminary hearing.  In fact this Court held in 
Timmerman that a defendant does not have Crawford rights of confrontation at a 
preliminary hearing and that such rights are trial rights. Timmerman at ¶ 13.   
Generally, preliminary hearing testimony should not be admissible at trial when a 
witness is unavailable, given the distinct purpose and limitations of a defendant at 
preliminary hearings. Based on the limited scope and purpose of a preliminary 
hearing a defendant may be forced by circumstance to limit cross-examination or 
may not cross-examine a witness at all.   
 
VI. ARGUMENT 
A. The Standard of Sixth Amendment Confrontational Rights as 
Articulated in Crawford was Not Properly Considered by the Court 
of Appeals 
In this case as well as recent similar cases, the Court of Appeals has stated 
that a defendant’s Crawford rights under the Sixth Amendment are satisfied by the 
“opportunity” to confront the witness at a preliminary hearing.  The Court of Appeals 
relies on the statement that "cross-examination takes place at preliminary hearing 
and at trial under the same motive and interest [as trial] as found in State v Brooks, 
638 P.2d 537, 541 (Utah 1981). However, as explained below, the Court of Appeals 
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questions the viability of this holding in Brooks.  In any event, such a holding does 
not reflect the purpose or practice of Utah preliminary hearings.  
The history behind the Confrontation Clause as protected by the Sixth 
Amendment is discussed extensively in Crawford.  A brief review the Clause's 
history as articulated in Crawford (541 U.S. at 43-57) will illustrate the importance 
of the right to confrontation in our system of law. The concept that an accused has 
the right to confront the witnesses against him dates back to Roman times, but was 
incorporated into English law in the 1600s. Id.  English courts developed the right, 
allowing out of court testimony only if the witness was unable to testify in person. 
Id.  English courts further developed the common law to require that statements 
made before trial were admissible only if the accused had a prior opportunity to 
cross-examine the witness. Id. Although several state constitutions included a right 
of confrontation, the United States Constitution did not originally include that right. 
Id.  Following criticism regarding the omission, the First Congress included the right 
in the Sixth Amendment. Id.  
The purposes behind both the federal and state Confrontation Clauses are well 
articulated.  The Confrontation Clause is designed to ensure that convictions are not 
obtained through the use of ex parte affidavits. See, Crawford at 59.  It has long been 
have recognized that testimony is much more reliable when it is given under oath at 
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trial where the witness can be cross-examined and the jury may observe the witness's 
demeanor.  People v. Fry, 92 P.3d at 978-979.   
 The right of an accused to confront the witnesses against him has been 
regarded as a fundamental right for hundreds of years. It was included in the United 
States to ensure that persons would not be convicted on the basis of ex parte 
testimony and without the benefit of cross-examination. This right remains crucial 
to our adversarial system of law. Id. Crawford refines this right to ensure that a 
defendant as a right to effective cross-examination.   Preliminary hearings in Utah 
do not allow, because of their limited nature, for purposeful and rigorous cross-
examination as is done at trial.  
In the current case, as well as the cases of State of Utah v. Garrido, 2013 UT 
App. 245 and State of Utah v. Goins, 2016 UT App. 57, ¶ 18, the Court of Appeals 
relied, in part, on State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537 (Utah 1981) and other authority 
decided before Crawford and prior to the changes made in preliminary hearing 
standards in Utah in 2001. See, State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9 at ¶ 10 (Utah 2001).  The 
Goins Court incorrectly concluded that the case of State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537 
(Utah 1981) was controlling, holding: 
The Supreme Court concluded in Brooks that "counsel's motive and 
interest are the same in either [the trial or preliminary hearing] setting; 
he acts in both situations in the interest of and motivated by establishing 
the innocence of his client. Therefore, cross-examination takes place at 
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preliminary hearing and at trial under the same motive and 
interest." Id. at 541  
Goins at ¶ 19.  
But in this case the Court of Appeals raises serious concerns regarding  
Brooks by stating at 2016 UT App. 105 ¶ 17 FN 3: 
On the other hand, we are also not convinced that a preliminary hearing 
always provides the opportunity for cross-examination guaranteed by 
the Confrontation Clause…. 
Moreover, thirteen years after Brooks was issued, the nature of 
preliminary hearings in Utah was changed by the passage of the Utah 
Victims' Rights Amendment. As relevant here, the Utah Constitution 
was amended to provide that "[w]here the defendant is otherwise 
entitled to a preliminary examination, the function of that examination 
is limited to determining whether probable cause exists" and to provide 
that "reliable hearsay evidence" is admissible at a preliminary 
hearing. See Utah Const. art. I, § 12. In light of these changes, the Utah 
Supreme Court overruled State v. Anderson, 612 P.2d 778 (Utah 1980), 
upon which the relevant portion of Brooks had partially 
relied. See State v. Timmerman, 2009 UT 58, ¶¶ 14-16, 218 P.3d 590. 
It is therefore unclear whether Brooks's blanket statement that "cross-
examination takes place at preliminary hearing and at trial under the 
same motive and interest" is still true insofar as Confrontation Clause 
rights are concerned. See Brooks, 638 P.2d at 541. 
Pham, 2016 UT App 105, ¶18 n. 3 (emphasis added).  
The key holding in Brooks is no longer persuasive, reasonable, or 
constitutional.  The Brooks case was decided over twenty (20) years before 
Crawford and thirteen years before the amendment to the Utah Constitution as it 
relates to preliminary hearings. See Utah Constitution, Art. 1, § 12.  There simply is 
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not the same protection of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to Confrontation at 
a preliminary hearing because of the very limited issues at play and the fact that such 
hearings are held early on in a case before all the facts and issues are as fleshed as 
they are for a trial. See, People v. Fry, 92 P.3d 970 (Colorado 2004).    
B. The Purpose of, and the Issues Presented by, a Preliminary Hearing 
in Utah are Very Limited and Therefore do not Protect a 
Defendant’s Crawford Rights 
In State of Utah v. Timmerman, 218 P.3d 590, 594 (Utah 2009), 2009 UT 58 
¶ 13 this Court declared: “Accordingly, we hold that the federal Confrontation 
Clause does not apply to preliminary hearings. In so doing, we note that a substantial 
number of jurisdictions have reached the same conclusion.”  This effectively means 
the rights as explained in Crawford do not apply at a preliminary hearing.  Yet, 
according to the Court of Appeals, if a defendant is allowed to cross-examine a 
witness at a preliminary hearing, such “confrontation” satisfies the requirements as 
articulated in Crawford. This is inconsistent with this Court’s decision in 
Timmerman. 
  In Goins 2015 UT App. 57, n. 7 the Court of Appeals states:  “It may behoove 
defense counsel in such cases to take full advantage of any opportunity to cross-
examine such witnesses. Then, if the testimony is read at trial, counsel's cross-
examination is part of what will be read, and the jury will have a less one-sided 
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version of the witness's testimony.”  This declaration may be justifiably interpreted 
by defense counsel as a warning to thoroughly cross-examine witnesses during the 
preliminary hearing, as the testimony may be admissible at trial.  Effectively, the 
defendant’s right to Confrontation is always at stake in a preliminary hearing and 
must be exercised.  This declaration is inconsistent with the scope and purpose of 
preliminary hearings in Utah. See Timmerman, Schmidt and Jones; See, also Fry, 92 
P.3d at 977-980.     
This Court held that Crawford rights are trial rights and do not apply at a 
preliminary hearing. Timmerman at ¶ 10. Yet, the Court of Appeals holds that 
Crawford rights are satisfied by a hearing where no such rights exist.  This Court’s 
decision in Timmerman was based, in part, on the Amendment to Utah Constitution 
Art. 1 § 12 in 1995.   This amendment must also be considered, and is part of the 
basis for this Court deciding that a defendant has no Crawford rights at a preliminary 
hearing.  
Recently, this Court thoroughly analyzed the purpose and scope of 
preliminary hearings in Utah in Schmidt, 2015 UT 65 (Utah 2015) and Jones, 2016 
UT 4 (Utah 2016).  At a preliminary hearing the prosecution must only demonstrate 
probable cause that a crime was committed and that the defendant committed the 
crime (the same burden for obtaining a warrant).  Schmidt at  ¶ 17.  The magistrate 
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may not weigh evidence and has limited discretion to evaluate credibility - 
essentially evaluating only impossible testimony.  Schmidt at ¶ 13.  In fact, in Jones 
this Court stated; “We have said that it is not appropriate for a magistrate to evaluate 
the totality of the evidence in search of the most reasonable inference at a 
preliminary hearing.” Id. ¶ 41 (internal quotations omitted).  This Court went on to 
hold, in Jones, that the probable cause standard can be met by the prosecution even 
if the evidence produced at the preliminary hearing may lead to an inference that 
acquittal is more likely than a conviction. Id. ¶ 41 (citation omitted). The probable 
cause standard is much different from the trial standard, guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt. See, Timmerman, ¶ 10.   Under the preliminary hearing standard, a defendant 
simply does not have a legitimate purpose, or ability, to conduct a thorough cross-
examination exercising Confrontation rights.   
Brooks is challenged by the purpose and limited nature of preliminary 
hearings. Defense counsel's motives and interests in cross-examining witnesses are 
not the same in preliminary hearing as during trial.   Incontestably, under the 
directives from this Court in Schmidt and Jones the interests and purpose of a 
defendant at a preliminary hearing vary extensively from trial.  Credibility of 
opposing witnesses is a critical part of trial, as it was in this case, and is effectively 
non-existent at a preliminary hearing.  See, Schmidt; Jones.  A large part of the finder 
of fact’s duty at trial is to weigh the evidence presented by witnesses based on 
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credibility and demeanor, and such weighing of evidence does not exist at a 
preliminary hearing. Schmidt; Jones.  
In this case, Pham claimed that he was acting in self-defense when he shot 
Menchaca.  The testimony of Menchaca was directly opposed to this claim.  The 
credibility of each witness at the trial was critical.  The jury heard Menchaca’s 
testimony as read by a prosecutor.  There was no chance for cross-examination 
regarding Menchaca’s credibility and veracity.  No observing of his demeanor as he 
was cross-examined. Under the circumstances of the trial in this case, such testimony 
is but a shell of the type of examination needed to protect Pham’s Sixth Amendment 
rights to Confrontation.    
There is also a significant practical argument supporting a holding that 
preliminary hearing testimony should not generally be allowed at trial.  Considering 
the issue in the context of judicial resources, if every preliminary hearing becomes 
a “mini-trial,” there may be little time left for judges to conduct actual trials.  It is a 
fair assumption that there are thousands of cases in Utah involving defendants who 
are charged with serious criminal offenses and are entitled to a preliminary hearing.  
If each of these cases resulted in preliminary hearing “mini-trials” wherein full and 
fair cross-examination as required under Crawford by going to every facet of a 
witness’ credibility and all other matters defense counsel wished to preserve for trial, 
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were to be allowed, the burden on already strained judicial resources would be 
mammoth. See, Fry at 977-980. 
Prior to the ruling by the Court of Appeals in this case and in Goins and 
Garrido defense counsel often did not cross-examination most witnesses at all, as 
cross-examination would be both premature and would serve no useful purpose in 
frustrating the prosecution’s ability to establish probable cause at a preliminary 
hearing.  However, if the climate of uncertainly that currently exists regarding this 
issue is allowed to continue, defense counsel out of necessity will have to do 
extensive cross examination in an attempt to exercise a defendant’s rights to 
confrontation of adverse witnesses.    
The State would have it both ways: a criminal defendant is provided the 
“opportunity” to fully and fairly confront the witness at preliminary hearing yet the 
purpose of a preliminary hearing is solely to establishing probable cause. See, 
Timmerman, ¶ 10.  The State takes diametrically opposed propositions.  The two can 
only be reconciled if the preliminary hearing court chooses to allow defense counsel 
ample latitude to cross-examine in areas which may have nothing to do with 
establishing probable cause.  Even then, it is questionable whether that sort of 
“opportunity” satisfies the needs of defense counsel when it comes time to cross-
examine a witness before a jury at trial and therefore satisfies the Sixth Amendment 
  
21 
under the Crawford standard. (As stated, supra, Timmerman holds that no such 
rights exist at a preliminary hearing.)  
Oftentimes, certainly more often than not, discovery is in its seminal stages 
just prior to a preliminary hearing. Many times defense counsel will request a 
preliminary hearing with the intention of discovering the witnesses and other 
evidence the prosecution will use in the case. The defense has no intent, or even the 
ability, to prepare and conduct the type of cross-examination as contemplated by 
Crawford.   In order to meaningfully cross-examine, counsel must have all the 
information which would be available at trial.  It is very troubling that one would 
feel compelled to cross-examine to the fullest extent possible, perhaps bringing forth 
inadmissible testimony or otherwise unfavorable testimony, without the benefit of 
discovery which would later be produced prior to trial.  And again, it second guesses 
defense counsel, as well as the magistrate, to a considerable degree. 
Finally, under the current climate there is much uncertainty and a lack of 
uniformity among the trial courts on how a preliminary hearing is conducted in 
regards to the issue of cross-examination.  Some magistrates allow extensive cross-
examination, while others allow very limited cross-examination.  This practice 
creates an uneven and possibly unconstitutionally defective system, because 
defendants receive unequal treatment depending on how each magistrate perceives 
what rights a defendant has at preliminary hearing.   The best practical method to 
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solve this dilemma is to continue to follow Timmerman and restrict preliminary 
hearing testimony and its accompanying cross examination to its declared purpose, 
probable cause, and eliminate the perceived fiction that a preliminary hearing as 
currently constituted in Utah protects a defendant’s Crawford rights to confrontation 
of witnesses.     
This Court should rule that, generally, that the Right of Confrontation, as 
examined in Crawford, is not protected during preliminary hearings in Utah and 
therefore is not admissible at trial absent exceptional circumstances.    
C. Other Jurisdictions Have Disallowed the Use of Preliminary Hearing 
Testimony at Trial 
As acknowledged by the Court of Appeals, other jurisdictions have not 
allowed preliminary hearing testimony to be admitted at trial, given the purpose of 
Confrontation and the scope of a preliminary hearing.  See, People v. Fry, 92 P.3d 
970 (Colorado 2004); State v. Stuart, 695 N.W.2d 259, at 266, ¶¶ 30, 32 (Wisconsin 
2005).  
In Fry, the Supreme Court of Colorado held that testimony at preliminary 
hearings is not admissible at trial based on an analysis of the basic purpose of the 
right of confrontation and cross-examination as detailed in Crawford. Fry at 974-76, 
978-80. The purpose and nature of preliminary hearings in Colorado is limited, and 
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the preliminary hearing standards and procedure are similar to Utah. The Fry Court 
found that testimony is “much more” reliable when a witness is cross-examined 
before a jury because the jury can observe the demeanor of the witness. Fry at 975.  
The Fry court found that under Colorado law, a preliminary hearing is limited 
to the determination of probable cause (the same standard as Utah) and the rights of 
the defendant are therefore curtailed. Id. at 976-78.  Evidentiary and procedural rules 
are relaxed, and the right to cross-examine witnesses, or introduce evidence, is 
limited to the question of probable cause. Id.  Once the prosecution has established 
probable cause, defense counsel has limited legal and practical legitimacy to pursue 
credibility inquiries. Id. at 976-77.  The Colorado court concluded that legitimate 
cross-examination at a preliminary hearing is limited and therefore, “a preliminary 
hearing does not provide the same safeguards as a trial.”  Id. at 977.  Similarly, this 
Court has held the confrontational cross-examination rights of a defendant are trial 
rights and do not exist at a preliminary hearing. Timmerman, at ¶¶ 9-11.  Therefore, 
because of the limited nature of a preliminary hearing, a defendant’s critical Sixth 
Amendment rights to confrontation of witnesses are not protected at a preliminary 
hearing in Utah.    
It cannot be disputed that Colorado’s preliminary hearing is essentially the 
same as explained by this Court in Timmerman, Schmidt, and Jones, as analyzed 
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above.  The purpose of a preliminary hearing in Utah is limited to a determination 
of probable cause, and the defendant does not have all the rights available at trial. 
See, Timmerman, at ¶ ¶10-13. 
The Texas courts have favorably cited Fry and the principles it stands for 
regarding the Crawford right of confrontation and cross-examination in the case of 
Coronado v. Texas, 351 S.W. 3d 315, 324-30 (Texas Ct. of Crim. App. 2011).  
Coronado did not involve preliminary hearing testimony but witness testimony 
made outside trial in a child abuse case.  Regarding the importance of Crawford 
rights the Texas Court stated:  
Indeed, it is that personal presence of the defendant and the right to ask 
probing, adversarial cross-examination questions that lies at the core of 
an American criminal trial's truth-seeking function. As the Supreme 
Court stated in California v. Greene, a 1970 Confrontation Clause case, 
the right of confrontation forces the witness to submit to cross-
examination, the "‘greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery 
of truth.’”  
Id. at 325-26.  
The Texas Court also stated that the main purpose for meaningful cross-
examination is to test the veracity and credibility of a witness. Id. at 326.  This is 
best done at a trial or, if not, the process must be sufficient to provide for proper 
exercise of Confrontation.  The Texas Court compared the situation of out of court 
interviews of child witnesses (with the limited opportunity to protect Crawford 
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rights) to a preliminary hearing by citing Fry. Id. at 327-28 (citing Fry).  The court 
explained that preliminary hearings are usually restricted to an assessment of 
probable cause and limit the defendant's right of cross-examination on credibility 
issues. Id.  Such hearings do not provide an adequate opportunity to cross-examine 
sufficient to satisfy the Confrontation Clause. Id.; See also, Blanton v. State, 978 So. 
2d 149, 154-56 (Florida 2008) (In order to satisfy Crawford, a defendant must have 
the opportunity to cross-examine a witness in a process designed to engage the 
adversarial testing of evidence).  
Furthermore, Fry has been followed and distinguished since its publication, 
but the basic principles for which it stands have never been effectively challenged. 
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin followed the reasoning of Fry holding that the 
scope of cross-examination in a preliminary hearing, “is limited to issues of 
plausibility, not credibility,” and, “is intended to be a summary proceeding to 
determine essential or basic facts relating to probable cause.”  State v. Stuart, 695 
N.W.2d 259, at 266, ¶ 30 and ¶ 32 (Wisconsin 2005).  Consequently, in Stuart the 
Supreme Court of Wisconsin concluded that the defendant’s right to Confrontation 
had been violated and further that the missing witness had real issues regarding 
motivation and credibility, requiring more extensive cross-examination.  The jury in 
Stuart also heard evidence regarding the missing witness’s criminal history, recent 
burglary, and dishonest statements to police, during trial. Id., at 266-67, ¶ ¶ 34-38. 
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Idaho distinguished Fry in State v. Mantz, 222 P.3d 471 (Idaho App. 2009). 
In Mantz, the Idaho appellate court explained that the Idaho Supreme Court had 
previously precluded the introduction of preliminary hearing testimony of a witness 
not present at trial for reasons similar to the holdings in Fry and Stuart, but changed 
course after explicit legislative action in 1989 allowing the testimony. Mantz, at 475-
76 (citing State v. Elisondo, 757 P.2d 675, 677 (Idaho 1988)).  
The court in Elisondo specifically found the admissibility of preliminary 
hearing testimony to be an issue of policy, rather than constitutionality. Mantz at 476 
(citing Elisondo at 678).  Idaho now analyzes the admissibility of preliminary 
hearing testimony on, “a case-by-case approach,” to determine adequacy of the 
opportunity for cross-examination. Mantz at 477 (citing State v. Ricks, 840 P.2d 400, 
440 (Idaho App. 1992)).  The appellate court of Missouri also declined to follow 
Fry, and despite finding similar policy considerations governing preliminary 
hearings, ruled that preliminary hearing testimony is admissible. State 
v. Aaron, 218 S.W.3d 501, at 516-17 (Mo. App. W.D. 2007).  
Fry has been distinguished in State v. Hannon, 703 N.W.2d 498 (Minn. 2005), 
State v. Henderson, 136 P.3d 401 (N.M.App. 2006), State v. Stano, 159 P.3d 931 
(Kan. 2007), Chavez v. State, 213 P.3d 476 (Nev. 2009), and State v. Mohamed, 130 
P.3d 401 (Wash. App. 2006). Hannon distinguished Fry because the defendant was 
provided a full opportunity to cross-examine the missing witness at his prior trial of 
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the case, not a preliminary hearing. Hannon at 507. Henderson explained that Fry is 
distinguishable based on procedural rules governing preliminary hearings, and that 
New Mexico does bar the admission of prior testimony when the circumstances of a 
case show, “a real difference in motive or other limitation in the prior cross 
examination.” Henderson at ¶ 11, ¶ 18 (internal citations omitted).  
Stano similarly distinguished Fry finding that the procedural aspects of a 
preliminary hearing are different in that Kansas allows witnesses to be cross-
examined on credibility during preliminary hearings and therefore is adequate. Santo 
at 945.   Chavez also distinguished Fry on procedural grounds stating, “Nevada law 
is generally more permissive with regard to a defendant’s right to discovery and 
cross-examination at the preliminary hearing,” and “we do not find anything in our 
state law that would hinder a defendant’s opportunity to cross-examine a witness at 
a preliminary hearing.” Chavez at 484. 
Finally, Mohamed similarly distinguished Fry on procedural grounds finding 
that the pretrial hearing testimony admitted at trial was subject to credibility 
determinations, not limited to probable cause, and was subject to appropriate 
motivation on direct examination. Mohamed at ¶ 20, ¶ 21.    
 This Court has recently examined the preliminary hearing process in Utah 
very thoroughly.  As now mandated by this Court, the preliminary hearing process 
does not contemplate nor provide for a defendant’s right of Confrontation under the 
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Sixth Amendment. See, Timmerman. The preliminary hearing process has such a 
low standard of proof, and its purpose so limited, that an adequate opportunity for 
cross-examination as required by Crawford does not generally exist under Utah’s 
current preliminary hearing process. Again, in Utah a preliminary hearing is not 
designed to use the adversarial process to test witnesses and evidence as a trial is 
designed to do.  Defendant Pham’s Crawford rights were not met in this case and 
the prior testimony of the Menchaca should have been excluded.  
 The Court of Appeals incorrectly concluded that Pham had a full and fair 
opportunity to cross-examine Menchaca at the preliminary hearing. Menchaca’s 
credibility was not at issue at the preliminary hearing. The existence of probable 
cause was the only matter of relevance. Pham did not have the right to confrontation 
at the preliminary hearing, and discovery was not complete. Pham requests that this 
Court reverse the Court of Appeals decision and hold that his Sixth Amendment 
right to confrontation was violated by the admission of Menchaca’s preliminary 
hearing testimony where Pham did not have a full and fair opportunity to cross-
examine him.  The jury did have the opportunity to view Pham’s testimony and 
demeanor, but viewed the demeanor of a prosecutor instead of Menchaca’s.  Pham 
could not challenge anything about Menchaca at trial, as is contemplated by 




VII.  CONCLUSION 
This Court should vacate Defendant Pham’s conviction and remand the case 
for a new trial excluding Menchaca’s preliminary hearing testimony.  
  
Dated this ____ day of November, 2016. 
     
 
______________________ 
        Michael J. Langford  
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In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously 
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the 
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the 




Article I, Section 12 [Rights of accused persons.]
          In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person and by
counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof,
to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory
process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by
an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed,
and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before final judgment,
be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall
not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against
her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the
same offense.
          Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the function of that
examination is limited to determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise provided by
statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined
by statute or rule in whole or in part at any preliminary examination to determine probable cause
or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is
allowed as defined by statute or rule.
